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Applying the Natural Law

.NATURAL LAW, UBERTY AND CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECtiON
Howard P. Kainz
Dept of Philosophy
Marquette University
U.S.A.
n discussions of liberty and conscientious objection very often issues of a religious and/or aesthetic nature -which are outside the scope of morality
proper - are intermingled with, or take the place
of, moral arguments. For this reason, I would suggest, as a kind of heuristic device, that we temporarily purloin Kierkegaard's distinction between the
aesthetic, ethical and religious spheres, using it at
the outset to cull out some extrinsic considerations
which can prevent us from coming to terms with
the strictly ethical issues in conscientious objection.
For example, with regard to liberty, there is a religious interpretation, advanced by Kierkegaard, according to which freedom is contradistinguished not
from necessity, but from sin. Liberty for the Christian
is essentially a state of grace and salvation, an inter·
pretation which may be concomitant and compatible
with political oppression or insuperable, practical obstacles to personal development or activity. With re·
gard to the-aesthetic (in the wide sense), we find .the
common concept of liberty as the "ability to preserve
one's natUre and do what one likes without unnecessary obstacles." This interpretation receives elaboration as a philosophical theory in the work of Hobbes
and others. Standing in the middle, as an example of
a strictly moral approach to liberty, is Immanuel
Kant's characterization of liberty as autonomy, the
rational self-determination of persons coordinated
into a kind of moral republic or "kingdom of ends."
As we consider the case of conscientious objection, it seems evident that in the main, extenuating
factors and exculpating circUJDstances which have
justified conscientious objection in the United States
have traditionally been of a religious nature. The
successful American Christian conscientious objector
typically appeais to his denomination's pacifist interpretation ·of Gospel spirituality (as with the Quakers), or to the complete independence of the "Kingdom of God" from secular authority (as with the Jehovah's Witneses). It is also possible for mainline
Catholics and Protestants to appeal to their own
pacifist interpretation, or the interpretation of their
faith subcommunity, as a justification for their stand
vis-a-vis war. But it is remarkable that for both draftboard adjudicators and anti-draft appellants, specifi-
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cally moral objections and arguments seem to be ex-

cluded by a kind of common consent. The venerable
hosts of utilitarians, deontologists, natural law theorists, etc. seem constrained to stand on the sidelines
when it comes to actual, practical, personal confrontations with one's draft board.
Are there any powerful, persuasive and germane
arguments of a purely moral nature sufficiently practical and applicable to serve to exonerate an individual from military combat service? In addressing this
question, we must first distinguish between approaches which emphasize a subjective decision-procedure- e .g., the negative Golden Rule that one
should not choose to do anything to anyone that he
would be unwilling for that person to do to him and approaches which are based on ostensibly more
objective considerations. Prima facie it would seem
that an objective norm such as "natural law," if it
could point to certain hard and publicly ascertainable
facts which are also indisputably common values,
woU!ld be a solid buttress against the welter of counterpoised "facts" that any government can muster up
in justifying mobilization and war and the drafting of
recruits for war.
Natural law· has at certain historical confluences
been simply identified with the positive law - e.g.,
the . "natural law" of·subjection of slaves to masters
in eras when slavery was officially condoned, the
"natural" domination of husband over wife, etc. But
it has also been at times the indispensable socio-political lever for transcending the oppression of positive laws. For example the natural law that government should be for the sake of, and/or with the consent of, the people governed has been the means of
justifying and instigating the overthrow of tyrannies.
In that particular species of oppression in which an
individual is being constrained unjustly to fight in a
war, or constrained to fight in an unjust war, or constrained to fight in any war in a context wherein no
war can conceivably be justified - can an appeal to
natural law be effective?
An initial elimination of one approach seems feasible: When it comes to conscientious objection, it
seems that an appeal to the law of "killing only for
self-defense" would be, in the last analysis, too in·
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conclusive: there is such an imposing array of actual
or potential hostile intentions in the international
arena that a protective or suspicious government can
always argue (orcibly that it is fighting a war of selfdefense, or initiating a preemptive war to obviate
the necessity of defending against inevitable and imminent aggression, or fighting not against specifically
military aggression but against, e.g., economic aggression which has the potential of destroying its
subsistence as a nation.
As one considers the applicability of natural law
theory to the issue in question, the first hurdle that
presents itself is, of course, the well known lack of
consensus, even among practitioners of natural law
themselves, as to which concept of "nature" and/or
"natural law" an appeal should be made. There are
some who would even be satisfied with the absolutely vague and completely innocuous principle of synderesis, "good is to be done and evil is to be avoided," which is highly unlikely to move any hearts at
the military conscription establishments! Faced with
this de facto lack of consensus, I would like to suggest in the interim {while pathfinders are still
searching for some path. to consensus) that two
somewhat specific tenets of traditional natural law
theories (certainly more specific than synderesis) are
eminently applicable to the issue of conscientious
objection:!) Universal human brotherhood (characteristic
especially of the stoicism of Epictetus), which relativizes all struggles of ascendancy of one national,
political, ethnic or religious group over another, and
disallows any thought of annihilating, or even subjugating, any group, is inherently incompatible with
wars which aim at such subordination or annihilating, or even subjecting, any group is inherently incompatible with wars which aim at such subordination or annihilation. (The recent "Eve" hypothesis
concerning the descent of the species from a single
woman gives genetic substantiation to this concept;
and the Treaty on Genocide, recently and belatedly
ratified by the U.S. Congress, might be taken as the
final, practical recognition of this principle in the
sphere of contemporary international law.) Cases in
point might be wars or campaigns directed against
Kurds, Jews or Palestinians, Hindus, Iraqis or Iranians at present; and in the past, U.S. intervention in
Vietnam to orchestrate the victory of one political
faction over the other would be objectionable for
similar reasons, unless it could have been shown
that one of the factions had been aiming at the
forcible extermination of the other.
2) The law of self·preservation, universally taken
for granted and almost a truism, receives particular
emphasis in the Thomistic version of .natural law,
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which emphasizes the teleology of aU natural beings
toward maintaining and fostering their existence. In
previous times, this law would not have been of
paramount importance for conscientious objection,
because war was considered a major, last-resort
means of self-preservation against a species of war itself, i.e., against nuclear war. Nuclear war, at a certain level of firepower, and in probable conjunction
with a "nuclear winter," has the potential of annihilating the human species, as well as aU other species
of life on the planet. And since at present even a limited or regional war could conceivably expand (as has
happened in the past) into a worldwide conflagration, war as an instrument for the resolution of conflicts must be viewed as a quaint luxury· for past generations. With the widespread recognition of such
possibilities and of such dangers in the last decade, a
timely appeal to the fundamental and ineluctable law
of self-preservation of the species, and of all the nationalities or peoples encompassed by the species,
should be both credible and powerful.
With deference to those who are anxious to avoid
any "naturalistic fallacies", we might observe that
both the above-mentioned laws - the law of allegiance to the human species as a whole, and the law
of self-preservation - are not only facts of existence
and continued existence, but also values, recognized
as commendable and rational at least in theory if not
always in practice by the vast majority of people of
the world. It is not this convergence of the fact and
value which should be considered paradoxical, but
rather the artificial separation of fact from value in
the first place (which has instigated in philosophical
discourse a multiplication of "naturalistic fallacies").
With a view to possible allegations of "objectivism," it should also be observed that the appeals
made both to universal brotherhood and to species
self-preservation give due respect to the elements of
subjectivity and historicity - and in fact it is precisely human social and political and technological
evolution that gives these long-standing natural laws,
recognized for millenia, a new and emphatic persuasive force in the present era.
One cannot, of course, predict how persuasive
such arguments from natural law might be with the
various officials an individual conscientious objector
might have to confront. But possibly we have now
sufficiently transcended our long-standing ignorance
of the terminal consequences and side-effects of nuclear attacJcs, and possibly we have even made sufficient advances beyond the narrow provincialism of
us-against-them, so that such "merely ethical" considerations might have as much or more force than
the strictly religious grounds that were considered
valid in past wars and past conscriptions. ~
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